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On a recent tally of the constitutions of the countries of the world, 82 percent include 
rights to work and to public education at state expense, 78 percent include physical 
needs rights, 72 percent the right to unionise and organise, and well over half include 
children’s rights and a smattering of other worker’s rights.1 The story of how social 
rights entered the modern lexicon of international human rights has been told and 
abridged many times. Another well-explored theme is the correct role for courts in 
enforcing social welfare rights provisions of constitutions.2 The object of the present 
                                                        
*  I would like to thank Oliver Gerstenberg and Octavio Ferraz for comments and David Dyzenhaus, 
Christoph Möllers, John Philip Thurn and Hans Michael Heinig for numerous discussions about the 
German experience. The German portion of the research was made possible by an Alexander von 
Humboldt Foundation’s Research Fellowship for Experienced Researchers (2014–15). 
1 David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 Cal. L. 
Rev. 101, 138 tbl. 2 (2011). 
2 Among the extended English-language treatments, there is Brian Ray, Engaging with Social Rights 
(2016); Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (2012); Katharine G. Young, Constituting Economic and 
Social Rights (2012); Virginia Mantouvalou and Conor Gearty, Debating Social Rights (2010); Sandra 
Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010); Sandra 
Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008); Mark Tushnet, 
Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional 
Law (2008); David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of 
 2 
chapter is to situate thinking about social rights in the broader tradition and 
contemporary theories of constitutionalism. Furthermore, it will examine an aspect of 
social constitutionalism that to my mind is underexplored by those working on 
judicially enforceable social rights—namely, the potential for social principles and 
even social rights provisions to have an indirect rather than directly enforceable 
impact on securing social entitlements in public and private law. Accordingly, this 
chapter will examine: (1) the theoretical and political history lying behind 
contemporary constitutional social rights talk; (2) the analytical structure and 
substantive content of social rights claims; (3) how social rights thinking fits into the 
influential constitutional theories of John Rawls and the deliberative democrats, 
notably Jürgen Habermas; and (4) three ways in which social constitutional principles 
can reinforce respect for social rights outside the conventionally understood role for 
directly enforceable social rights.  
 
<a>A PRELUDE: SOCIAL RIGHTS BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND SOCIALISM 
 
It is common ground that classical liberal thought concentrated on a relatively narrow 
set of classical civil liberties concerned with imposing limits on the scope of state 
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action. A theoretically sophisticated restatement of classical laissez faire liberalism 
can be found in the work of Friedrich Hayek.3 According to Hayek, “[a] society in 
which free individuals co-operate under conditions of division of labor…is the 
essential condition of individual freedom, and to secure it is the main function of 
law.”4 The Rechtsstaat and rule of law ideas recognise this idea and aim to promote 
it. 5  However, economic planning violates this rule of law necessarily because it 
involves the creation of vast amounts of administrative discretion.6 Hayek provides a 
legally and philosophically sophisticated restatement of a tradition, it must be noted. 
As Carl Schmitt pointed out in 1928, the entire notion of a constitutional state in 
German state theory was bound up with liberal individualist thought. 7 This was no 
mere theoretical gloss, either. The rhetoric of constitutionalism and the rule of law 
provided the locus for highly potent juristic and political opposition to the growth of 
the welfare and regulatory state in both the United States and the United Kingdom.8 
To this day, federalism, bicameralism and constitutional judicial review are treated as 
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“veto-points” or equivalent barriers to welfare state growth by political scientists 
familiar with this history. 9  The contemporary offspring of classical liberal 
constitutionalism is found in the enormously influential field of public choice theory 
and constitutional economics, which is broadly libertarian.10 
Due in no small part to this liberal trajectory, socialism from the outset also 
had an ambivalent relationship with rights-rhetoric and constitutionalism. While the 
more gradual and reformist elements of socialist thought in Germany and Britain were 
open to the discourse of rights and freedom, and had a pronounced impact on 
legislative changes, the farther left was resolute in its opposition to rights discourse. 
Marx laid the grounds for his critique of liberal rights in his essay, ‘On the Jewish 
Question’ (1843) and reaffirmed it in his ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ (1875) 
towards the end of his life.11 Marx argued that liberal rights are merely atomistic 
rights for an egoistic man. A right to property is “the right of selfishness”.12 The right 
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10 James M. Buchannan and Gordon J. Tulock, The Calculus of Consent (1962); William H. Riker, 
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to freedom, for instance, and as with equality, is “that of a man treated as an isolated 
monad and withdrawn into himself.”13  Of the proclaimed right of equality in the 
opening clause of the German Social Democratic Party’s Gotha Programme, he was 
excoriating of its formalism: “[t]his equal right is an unequal right for unequal 
labor.”14 His core argument was that liberal rights are empty and purely formal for 
those not in possession of the means to enjoy them—and in his time, that was the vast 
majority. Marx’s critique was and remains potent.15 
For all these reasons, the concept of social rights had a very rocky start, with 
enemies on the right and left. But liberalism underwent an early transformation in 
Britain and the United States, while social democracy evolved as a socialist 
alternative to the Marxist variety of communism. The reconciliation of rights-based 
thinking with the problem of social inequality began in earnest in the late nineteenth 
century. In Britain, the first nation to industrialise, the late-Victorian philosophy of 
“new” or “social” liberalism emerged and had a profound impact on the Liberal 
Party.16 Harold J. Laski, a constitutional and political theorist as well as a prominent 
and senior member of the UK Labour Party, argued for an extended suite of social as 
                                                        
13Id., at 146. 
14 Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, supra note 11. 
15 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 148–52 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). See id. at 176–79 
for (late) clarification of how he felt his theory met this objection. Joseph Raz’s liberal perfectionism 
and Philip Pettit’s republicanism are examples of freedom-based theories that more directly confront 
this problem in liberal theory. 
16 Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats (1978); Peter Weiler, The New Liberalism: Liberal 
Social Theory in Great Britain, 1889-1914 (1982). 
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well as classical civil rights in his most systematic work. 17  The sociologist T.H. 
Marshall would later describe the legislative creation of social rights by the Liberal 
and post-war Labour Governments as the emergence of a significant new category of 
rights—social rights or rights of social citizenship.18  
In the United States, social democracy gained little traction, but classical 
liberalism was also around a similar time overtaken by the emergence of a new form 
of more progressive, sometimes called “pragmatic” liberalism associated in particular 
with John Dewey.19 Dewey was himself inspired and influenced by T.H. Green, the 
earliest of the new liberals in Britain. Dewey believed that the state must secure the 
conditions to enable real rather than formal freedom for its citizens. While he was 
critical of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s gradualist centrism, and of rights 
rhetoric in particular, the basic social insights underlying many New Deal 
intellectuals were in harmony with Dewey and the new liberals’ restatement of 
liberalism. President Roosevelt gave formal expression to his perceived harmony 
between civil and social freedoms in his “Four Freedoms” speech to Congress in 
1941, while his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, would play a leading role in drafting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
                                                        
17 Harold J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics 106–30 (1925) 
18 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in T.H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and 
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19 Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism 89–99 (1995) (on TH Green’s 
impact on Dewey); id. at ch. 8 (on Dewey’s politics); id. at 292–95 (for a harsh assessment of the 
coherence of Dewey’s opposition to Roosevelt’s policies).  
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Events in post-WWI Germany moved quite dramatically towards an overt 
fusion in the Weimar Constitution of 1919 of classical civil liberties and social 
democratic rights and freedoms. While an elaborate theory of social rights per se was 
not in wide circulation, the idea of a soziale Rechtsstaat (social rule of law state or 
social constitutional state) was developed by politically engaged social democratic 
jurists such as Hermann Heller, Franz Neumann and Otto Kirschheimer among 
others.20 Though they rarely defined the concept in straightforward terms, all opposed 
it to the “liberal Rechtsstaat”21 and Neumann comes closest by declaring its object to 
be “the realisation of social freedom.”22 None of the Weimar Constitution’s elaborate 
social provisions survived in the post-war Federal Republic of Germany’s Basic Law 
of 1949, though the latter did include—without any discussion at the drafting stage—
a commitment to the principle of the social state (Article 20(1) and the social rule of 
law (Article 20(1), Article 28).23  It also included Article 15 (the socialization clause) 
which permitted an elected government to nationalize the means of production. The 
significance of these provisions spawned much post-war juristic debate about the 
                                                        
20 Otto Kirschheimer and Franz Neumann, Social Democracy and the Rule of Law (Keith Tribe trans., 
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22 Franz Neumann, The Social Significance of the Basic Laws in the Weimar Constitution, in Social 
Democracy and the Rule of Law 27, 39 (Otto Kirschheimer and Franz Neumann eds., Keith Tribe 
trans., 1987).  
23 Hans Michael Heinig, Der Sozialstaat im Dienst der Freiheit. Zur Formel vom “sozialen“ Staat in 
Art. 20 Abs. 1 GG 38–39 (2008).  
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nature of the social state principle and social rule of law, most famously that between 
Ernst Forsthoff and Wolfgang Abendroth in 1954.24 While the former argued that 
combination of a liberal Rechtsstaat and socialist dirigisme was impossible, the latter 
argued that the commitment de-liberalized the constitution and commended social 
readings of its various provisions.  
The German experience and discussion was a powerful influence on the 
development of the concept of the social and democratic rule of law state (“Estado 
social y democratico de derecho”) proclaimed in Article 1 of the Constitution of 
Spain of 1978, 25  which in turned inspired a number of similar Latin American 
constitutional provisions. Notably, in the Spanish constitution, as with the Italian 
(1946) and French (1946 (Preamble), 1958) ones, the recognition of social rights did 
not tend towards any assertive role for courts in extending social provision. That was 
true of similar provisions across Europe.26 Indeed, it is notable that among all the 
versions of liberalism and social democracy that were receptive of the idea of social 
rights, in no case was it considered that such provisions ought to be enforced 
                                                        
24 Collected along with others in Sozialstaatlichkeit und Rechtsstaatlichkeit: Aufsätze und Essays 
(Ernst Forsthoff ed., 1968).  
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Maria Dolores Utrilla Fernandez-Bermejo for bringing this work to my attention. 
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vigorously by the judiciary (though neither was it argued successfully they were 
juridically inert).27  
 
<a>THE SUBSTANCE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 
Some authors believe that reference to social “rights” is an analytical or category 
mistake, however much they (might) accept the political importance of a 
redistributive welfare state. Earlier, the objection was largely about social rights not 
being important enough or because positive obligations were not enforceable. The 
present discussion is rather more sophisticated.  The charge is that the concept is 
neither compatible with the analytical structure of rights, nor, and relatedly, is it 
precise enough to merit the designation of rights. 
 
<b> A. The Nature of Rights 
 
Theorists tend to divide between “will” and “interest” theories of rights, 28 and the 
division often, if accidentally, tracks a disagreement about whether social rights are 
properly called rights. Both are accounts of what it is to possess a right, and the 
analytical relationships between rights-holders and duty-bearers.  
                                                        
27 Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law 137–41 (1997) 
(describing Heller’s theory as a “jurisprudence of judicial restraint”). 
28 For a penetrating analysis and rebuttal of both traditions, see Leif Wenar, The Nature of Rights, 33 
Phil. and Pub. Affairs 223 (2005). 
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The will theory (at times also called the “choice theory”) postulates that a right 
claim is characterized by a specified power of the right-holder over the duty-bearer’s 
obligation. Rights are defined primarily by the existence of concrete and immediate 
claims over the duty-bearer. The approach, as oft noticed, tends to be located within a 
theory of substantive rights that make the pre-eminent and at times sole ultimate right 
the right to equal freedom.29 The core idea of the theory implies a relatively firm 
correlativity between rights-holders and duty-bearers. The idea of a free-floating but 
ill-defined obligation against the “state” sits uneasily with this more rigid framework. 
In the language of Onora O’Neill, the rights must be “claimable” because “[w]e 
normally regard supposed claims or entitlements that nobody is obliged to respect or 
honour as null and void, indeed undefined.”30  For her, social rights fall at this hurdle.  
There are oft-noticed difficulties with the will theory that have particular 
relevance to social rights.31 The emphasis on “choice” over duty-bearers means that it 
requires the right-holder to have rational agency, which excludes children’s rights and 
those of persons without mental capacity. It also cannot account for non-waivable 
rights, such as the right not to be enslaved or torture. The strict correlativity between 
rights and duties, furthermore, and that the identity of the duty-bearer be known 
immediately, seem implausible. As Joseph Raz shows, there is a “dynamic aspect of 
rights” in the sense of their being capable of generating new duties. As circumstances 
                                                        
29 H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 Phil. Rev. 175 (1955).  
30 Onora O’Neill, The Dark Side of Human Rights, 81 Int’l Affairs 427, 430 (2005); see also Onora 
O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue 131 ff. (1996).  
31 See Neil MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in Law, Morality and Society (PMS Hacker and Joseph 
Raz eds., 1977). 
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change (e.g., a change in law or social facts), the same right serves as the basis for 
new duties.32  
The most influential account of the interest theory is found in the work of 
Joseph Raz but is evident in a range of writers from Jeremy Bentham, Rudoph von 
Jhering, Neil MacCormick and David Lyons. In Raz’s account, “‘X has a right’ if and 
only if X can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being 
(his interest) is a sufficient reason for nolding some other person(s) under a duty.”33 
On this view, rights are the ground for duties of others. The right-holder needs not be 
a rational person, nor need it control the duty-bearer in any way.34  The person’s 
interest, rather than control over another’s duty, is the locus of attention. Such 
interests generate various duties that can graduate from indeterminacy to determinacy, 
be ascribed and transferred to new duty-holders. Raz uses the child’s right to 
education as the example to illustrate this very point.35  
Naturally, the interest theory is the most conducive to thinking about social 
rights. It is the approach followed in the leading work of Cécile Fabre, among 
others.36 The interest theory is nevertheless not without fault, and its faults emerge in 
the analysis of social rights in particular. For one, the theory does not account 
effectively for the fundamental character of human or constitutional rights (though the 
                                                        
32 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 171 (1986). 
33 Id. at 166. 
34 See MacCormick, supra note 31, at 189. 
35 Id. at 170–71, 184–85. 
36 Cécile Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life (2001); King, 
supra note 2, at ch. 2; John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in Freedom From Poverty 
as a Human Right 75 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2007). 
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will theory suffers from the same problem). 37  The flexibility of the model is 
purchased with a very (some might say extremely) low peremptory character or 
trump-like quality for the right at issue. For another, it arguably stands willing to 
accept that someone’s interest or need can generate ill-defined obligations and for at 
times unknown duty-bearers.  This is less of an answer to the objection of Onora 
O’Neill, so much as a refusal to acknowledge the problem.38  
 
<b>B. The Content of Social Rights Claims 
 
We can now pick up the gauntlet just thrown down: what exactly are social rights 
claims and who is obliged to meet them? Demands, naturally, for resources related to 
fundamental social interests, but how stringent are the demands and against whom are 
they lodged? Fabre argues that at base social rights claims are claims to a minimally 
decent life.39 I also follow this approach in Judging Social Rights, where I took some 
time to identify the content of a social minimum and the process for identifying it in 
particular communities.40 In doing so, I examined how poverty has been studied in 
various countries, and what is revealed about subjective perceptions of poverty in 
                                                        
37 C.f. Raz, supra note 32, at, 186–92 (describing “The Importance of Rights,” and his definition of 
“fundamental rights”). In H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory 192–93 
(1982), H.L.A. Hart conceded the same problem.  
38 See Simon Hope, Kantian Imperfect Duties and Modern Debates about Human Rights, 22 J. Pol. 
Phil. 396, 408–09 (2014), for this type of objection to theorists that deny claimability is an essential 
feature of rights.  
39 Fabre, supra note 36, at ch. 1, especially 22 ff. 
40 King, supra note 2, at ch. 2. 
 13 
social surveys. I concluded there that the social minimum will be composed of a 
bundle of resources (understood as cash benefits, in-kind services and market 
regulations) that satisfies three relevant thresholds: a healthy subsistence threshold, a 
social participation threshold, and an agency threshold. (The resources in such a 
bundle are sensitive to what Sen refers to as functionings, and hence not vulnerable to 
the capabilities critique offered by Sen and Nussbaum). The first two of these 
thresholds are not particularly difficult for social scientists to identify, applying the 
appropriate methodology. An “agency threshold”, I argue, requires a bundle of 
resources and opportunities that gives persons a “real possibility” to engage in basic 
life planning, including the capacity to frame and achieve long-term goals. The most 
abstract statement of the social minimum is that it must provide a material foundation 
for self-respect by making its attainment a real possibility.41 A social minimum, in 
this conception, is well below what social justice, or social citizenship rights, might 
demand.42  
The institutional structures for delivering this kind of a social minimum are 
very well-known, though they vary between and even within states. A minimum floor 
of social protection is evident in the International Labour Organisation’s the Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) , its more recent work on 
the idea of a “social floor”, and is also seen in perusing the contents of any 
compilation of welfare state studies or social policy textbook. It contains a suite of 
means-tested or contributory benefits including social assistance (welfare), 
                                                        
41 Id. at 29–33. 
42 To compare the potential difference, see Stuart White, The Civic Minimum, at ch. 4 (2003), which 
includes self-realization and minimization of class inequality among the aspects of a civic minimum. 
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unemployment, disability and work accident, housing (depending on other benefits) 
and pensions. To this there must be guaranteed universal access to primary health 
care, and the same for primary and, depending on the society, secondary education. 
Now, although nearly all wealthy countries have all of these, most developing 
countries have only a few and in some cases none of these benefits. This raises an 
important question of how social rights talk fits with Kant’s important observation 
that “ought implies can”. A full reckoning of this issue is too deep for the present 
study. Nevertheless, the interest theory of rights, examined above, provides a 
conceptual framework that explains both the normative purchase of the (unfulfilled) 
interest and the (excusable) non-performance of state duties in relation to it. It also 
explains how interest-based rights can generate, in nearly all cases, some duties that 
obligate states to strive progressively within resources to secure the full spectrum of 
the right.  
The actual benefit levels that would satisfy the three thresholds for the social 
minimum will depend on the composition and challenges faced by particular 
communities. Hence their determination must be with an eye on communal variation. 
The practice of setting a nation-wide poverty threshold at a percentage (usually 
between 40–60 percent) of median income may be a useful heuristic, but is too 
indiscriminate to be used exclusively to define a social minimum. A properly 
determined social minimum could be lower, but will often be higher. Its 
determination requires a multifactorial study of the costs of a basket of essential 
goods and services, including housing and health, calibrated for age and family status, 
but also in consideration of social participation and life-planning needs. This is not 
only feasible, but is an approach now pursued among a range of social scientists and 
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foundations that study poverty. 43  In my contention, what is essential is that the 
process for specifying the social minimum or poverty level be determined not by a 
Ministry under the control of a cabinet member, but by an agency with the resources 
and an ongoing mandate to set and review the minimum. Such an agency should be 
endowed with the status of independence reserved for judges, ombudspersons, 
auditors and the like. However, I am not aware of any country that does this outside 
the health and education fields. 
The bundle of resources will of course correspond to needs that are also 
determined by how a regulated market operates. Thus the social minimum must be 
determined not only by reference to cash and in-kind benefits (e.g. free health care, 
public housing) but also market regulation. Such regulatory measures may include 
provision for sectoral wage bargaining, compulsory participation in public or private 
insurance schemes, nationalization and subsidization of key industries, as well as the 
conventional forms of labour standards, general health and safety standards in goods 
and services, health care, education, pharmaceuticals and other related fields. The 
precise nature of these standards varies between communities, but there is a large 
amount of convergence as well as guidance from supranational bodies, notably 
including the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization. 
The scope of regulation, particularly in the field of labour relations, but more broadly 
as a feature of regulatory convergence in the service of trade harmonization, is a very 
debated question. The desirability of labour “flexicurity” (easy dismissal with strong 
benefits) and the impact of trade liberalization on welfare state outcomes are not 
                                                        
43 One such study is the Minimum Income Standards framework undertaken under the auspices of 
Loughborough University in the United Kingdom. For other studies, see King, supra note 2, at ch. 2.  
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questions to be answered in theory. And the evidence on them remains divided. This 
type of fact-sensitivity at the margins is hardly unique to social rights. 
 This takes us to the final question—the one concerning duty-bearers. The 
simplest answer is that the primary duty-bearer is the state. The state is the 
“community” personified, and hence it offers the medium through which 
interpersonal obligations can be fulfilled. The idea that social rights claims identify no 
duty bearer is, upon close scrutiny, misguided. The process described above will 
produce a clear bill as well as a set of procedural obligations, and the bill can be 
ascribed to society at large, that is, as a collectivity. The interpersonal obligation to 
support—just as with the duty to protect people’s civil rights—is managed by the 
state, for only collectively can it be discharged properly. It has traditionally done so 
through redistributive taxation and market regulation.44 However, private individuals 
will also owe others direct interpersonal social rights-based duties, especially within 
but also beyond the family. Generally, the content of these duties will be proscribed in 
detail by legislation. Sometimes, however, their content will be determined 
casuistically by courts of law either applying legislation or elaborating general 
principles of law (e.g. professional fiduciary obligations, duties to negotiate in good 
faith, duties of care etc). The recognition of social rights as human or constitutional 
rights will condition how such law may be applied. This is examined in the final 
section below.  
                                                        
44 A relevant abstract discussion of the background institutions for distributive justice is found in John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 242–51 (Rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter A Theory of Justice] (discussing the 




<a>SOCIAL RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE 
 
Even if the language of rights is apt, and a social minimum can be identified with 
some precision, what remains missing are arguments for why society as a whole, and 
especially those whose income or property is taxed for redistribution, ought to accept 
the purported obligation to secure the social minimum. Rather than survey various 
theories of distributive justice, and in light of space limitations, this section will focus 
on the relationship between social rights and political legitimacy in two preeminent 
constitutional theories that squarely address the question of distributive justice.45   
  
<b>A. Rawls: The Social Contract and Justice as Fairness 
The best known account of why people might accept such an obligation can be found 
in Rawls’ justice as fairness. 46 Rawls asks us to imagine what principles of justice 
free and equal persons would choose under conditions of fairness to govern the basic 
structure of a well-ordered society. To simulate fair conditions, he asks us to imagine 
representatives choosing such principles from behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance 
(“the original position”) in which no one would know what social position and natural 
talents she would hold in the resulting society. Rawls argues that free, equal and 
                                                        
45 I regrettably lay to one side not only the right-libertarian theories of Robert Nozick, Richard Epstein 
and Randy Barnett, but also the more congenial and increasingly influential constitutional implications 
of the work of Philip Pettit, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. So to also with left-libertarian 
arguments for a universal basic income.  
46 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) [hereinafter Justice as Fairness]; John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism (1996) [hereinafter Political Liberalism]; A Theory of Justice, supra note 44; John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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rational persons would choose two principles: (1) an adequate scheme of basic 
liberties compatible with equal liberties for all; and (2) that any social and economic 
inequalities would (a) be attached to offices and positions under conditions satisfying 
equal opportunity for all, and (b) be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged-
members of society (the difference principle, or, the maximin principle).47 The first 
principle is given “lexical priority” over the second, but for Rawls it is clear that both 
must be realized in any fair society.  
 Notably, the difference principle is very demanding. Any deviation from 
perfect equality in the distribution of resources must be justified in terms of favouring 
the least well-off. While at first this looks like an apology for a U.S. style liberal 
welfare capitalism, Rawls makes clear in his later work that a welfare state would not 
suffice. Only a property owning democracy, in which ownership is widely dispersed 
and accumulations of wealth are prevented, or, liberal socialism, which permits a free 
though very highly regulated market, would suffice. The welfare state is rejected 
because although it guarantees something akin to the social minimum explained 
above, it would tolerate inequalities and concentrations of wealth that can produce 
what we would now call social exclusion: “a discouraged and depressed underclass 
many of whose members are chronically dependent on welfare.” 48  Nevertheless, 
Rawls repeatedly made clear that while the difference principle itself would be agreed 
behind the veil of ignorance, the policies giving effect to it would be introduced at the 
                                                        
47 A Theory of Justice, supra note 44, at 72; Justice as Fairness, supra note 46, at 42–43. 
48 Justice as Fairness, supra note 46, at 140. See id. at 138–40 for the discussion of the three systems. 
The preface to the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, supra note 44, at xiv–xxvi, he clarifies the 
new emphasis on these differences. 
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legislative rather than constitutional stage.49 Social justice on that (early) view is not 
for the constitution but rather for the legislature.  
 There are at least four different ways ways in which justice as fairness requires 
a guaranteed social minimum providing for the basic needs of all citizens. The first 
and second are through the ideas of the difference principle itself and the “strains of 
commitment” idea that is inherent in the social contract idea. These are best explained 
together. One common criticism of the difference principle is that its egalitarian 
(maximin) nature is more onerous than what rational people might choose in the 
original position—they may prefer to gamble for average utility if it resulted in a 
higher likely distribution after the veil is lifted.50 Jeremy Waldron has supplied a 
different argument for averting the average utility principle.51 He shows that under 
Rawls’ theory, another crucial reason why parties do not choose a utility-maximizing 
option instead of the risk-averse difference principle, is because of the “strains of 
commitment” idea already contained within justice as fairness. This idea is that 
principles chosen in the original position should not be so onerous that persons cannot 
reasonably remain committed to them once the veil is lifted and life’s hardships are 
assumed. Because of the one-off, irreversible and pervasive implications of the 
choice, the strains of commitment idea is an important feature of the hypothetical 
contract. But Waldron argues that the idea justifies choosing a social minimum 
covering basic needs and not the difference principle. Rawls was prompted by 
                                                        
49 A Theory of Justice, supra note 44, at 171–76; Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 227–30. 
50 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 66 ff. (1990), for a 
statement of and reply to this view.  
51 Jeremy Waldron, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, 3 J. Applied Phil. 21 (1986). 
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Waldron’s critique to revise his criticism of the utility principle.52 However, Rawls 
continued to believe that free and equal persons in the original position would choose 
the difference principle instead of the social minimum. He argued that the strains of 
commitment would prevent outcomes that are: (1) so severe that people would resort 
to violence to improve their lot; and (2) are so unequal that they cause people to 
withdraw, feeling sullen and resentful, unable to feel “part of society, and view the 
public culture with its ideals and principles as of significance to themselves.”53 He 
concluded that the social minimum would protect against the former, but the 
difference principle is required to defeat the latter. The difference principle is plainly 
more demanding and hence both ideas protect the social minimum.54  
 A third way in which Rawls’ theory may also be understood to protect a social 
minimum is through the idea of fair equality of opportunity. This idea, contained with 
the second principle of justice, is that people must “have the same prospects of 
success regardless of their initial place in the social system.”55 Social positions are not 
                                                        
52 Justice as Fairness, supra note 46, at 127–30. One of the alternatives to the difference principle that 
parties are said to consider in the original position is the principle of average utility combined with a 
social minimum. See A Theory of Justice, supra note 44, at 105 ff. 
53 Justice as Fairness, supra note 46, at 129. 
54 Id. at 162. Rawls in fact discusses contrasting specifications of the social minimum in section 38.4. 
One of them refers to a citizen's essential needs required to lead a decent human life, and the other is 
specified by the difference principle. Following Waldron's discussion, supra note 51, and indeed 
Rawls' discussion in Political Liberalism, supra note 46 at 228–29, I have rather used the expression 
“social minimum” to refer only to the essential needs conception and I contrast it with the difference 
principle. 
55 A Theory of Justice, supra note 44, at 63, 73 ff. 
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just open in the formal sense, but all should have a fair chance to attain them.56 Frank 
Michelman has developed the link between the social minimum and this principle.57 
 A fourth way is the idea that the first principle protects political liberties and 
their fair value. The fair value of the political liberties was an idea having presence in 
the 1971 statement of his theory, but it was developed to accommodate the objection 
that the liberties protected by his first principle were unduly formal. The fair value of 
the political liberties means that “everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office 
and to influence the outcome of political decisions.”58 As Thomas Pogge has argued, 
this would effectively require that the first principle also guarantee a social 
minimum.59 Rawls’ later comments on the essential structure for “public political 
deliberation” to be “possible and fruitful”—which became an essential component of 
political legitimacy in Political Liberalism—also require at least a guaranteed social 
minimum to ensure fair access to and participation in such deliberation.60 In that 
                                                        
56 Id. at 63; Justice as Fairness, supra note 46, at 43–44; Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 324–31. 
57 Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of 
Justice, 121 U. Penn. L. Rev. 962, 988–89 (1973). 
58 Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 327. See generally id. at 318, 324–31; see also Justice as 
Fairness, supra note 46, at 148–50; c.f. A Theory of Justice, supra note 44, at 179 (discussing poverty 
and the “worth of liberty”). 
59 Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls 145 (1989). An outstanding essay in this regard is Norman Daniels, 
Equal Liberty and the Unequal Worth of Liberty, in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of a Theory of 
Justice 253 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975), and Rawls’ reply in Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 
324–31. 
60 Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at lvi–lvii. 
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respect, he arguably joins the list of deliberative democrats below who see a social 
minimum as a basis for communicative competence or effective participation. 
 The constitutional status and enforceability of the social minimum is also 
something Rawls addressed. In Political Liberalism, he is clear if too brief that it is a 
“constitutional essential” and that the difference principle is more demanding and is 
not.61 He also found that it should presumably be entrenched and judicially enforced, 
and is on part with the basic liberties in this respect.62  Rawls clarifies that as a 
constitutional essential, the obvious character of “basic human needs…meets the 
desideratum that the fulfillment, or lack of it, of a constitutional essential should be 
fairly obvious, or at any rate, a matter open to public view that courts should be 
reasonably competent to address.” 63  Even so, Frank Michelman, whose work 
appeared to convince Rawls of this view, takes a more subtle view of whether Rawls 
believed constitutional entrenchment and judicial review should follow. After 
admitting that “[i]t all does make one’s head spin, a little”, Michelman concludes 
tentatively that he did. 64 Michelman’s own work on social rights is vast, profound and 
                                                        
61 Id. at 228–29. 
62 Id. at 166, 228–29; Justice as Fairness, supra note 46, at 162.  
63 Justice as Fairness, supra note 46, at 162. 
64 Samuel Freeman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls 394, 403–04, 406–07 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). To me Rawls’ endorsement in 
Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 228–29, and as quoted above, seems relatively clear. 
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very subtle—worthy of standalone essays. 65  While he sees a subtle role for 
constitutional adjudication, his ambivalence is also noteworthy.  
<b>B. Habermas: Discourse Ethics and Deliberative Democracy 
 
Deliberative democrats believe that traditional democratic politics and liberal theory 
suffer from several problems. 66  Voting has a hard time accounting for adaptive 
preferences. Social choice theory indicates significant potential for arbitrariness in 
voting. Above all, the “fact of reasonable pluralism” and “moral disagreement” mean 
that reliance on “comprehensive moral doctrines” would be an illegitimate basis for 
coercing others. For Habermas and many others (notably Richard Rorty) it is also 
epistemically implausible to press forceful ethical claims at a time of “post-
                                                        
65 A brilliant example of which is William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on 
Social Rights, 1969-Present, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 597 (2004). See id. at 631–36 on the role for courts. See 
also the more extended companion piece William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, 
Critique and Reconstruction, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1821 (2001). 
66 In respect of the paragraph that follows, consider Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in 
Deliberative Democracy, in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 95 
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996), reprinted in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics 407, 
414 (James Bohman and William Rehg eds., 1997) [hereinafter Deliberative Democracy]; John 
Dryzek, Delibertive Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations, at ch. 1, 2 (2000); 
Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 35–40, and ch. 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 10 
Phil. and Pub. Affairs 3 (1991). See also Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, at ch. 1 
(William Rehg trans., 1996); and William Rehg, Translator’s Introduction, in Habermas, supra, at 
xxii–xxiv, for deeper epistemological reasons for focusing on communication as a source of validity. 
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metaphysical thinking.” The influence of this thinking on constitutionalism and the 
role of judicial review is important and growing rapidly.67  
 The response deliberative democrats give to these problems is to argue for a 
theory of political legitimacy that is produced in accordance with a deliberative 
procedure that satisfies certain substantive and procedural criteria: “claims on behalf 
of or against [collective] decisions have to be justified to these people in terms that, 
on reflection, they are capable of accepting.” 68  In effect persons who would be 
affected by the political decision should be enabled to participate freely and equally in 
iterative deliberation over the decision. Their claims should be heard and given 
consideration, in the ultimate effort of seeking mutual acceptability and ideally 
consensus.69 Hence, the legitimacy of political decisions depends on the deliberative 
conditions observed when making them. Several conceptions require the recognition 
of a social minimum to preserve equal, effective participation as well as 
communicative competence. For Joshua Cohen, for instance, the requirement that 
participants be equal creates a strong presumption in favour of an egalitarian 
distribution of resources akin to Rawls’ difference principle.70 This is entailed by the 
idea that “the participants are substantively equal in that the existing distribution of 
power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute at any state of the 
                                                        
67 See The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism (Ron Levy, Hoi Kong, Graeme Orr 
and Jeff King eds., forthcoming). 
68 Dryzek, supra note 67, at 1. 
69 Id.; and Deliberative Democracy, supra note 67, provide good introductions to the vast literature.  
70 Cohen, supra note 66, at 422; see also Joshua Cohen, The Economic Basis of Deliberative 
Democracy, 6 Soc. Phil. and Pol. 25, 33 (1989) [hereinafter Cohen, Economic Basis]. 
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deliberative process…”71 Gutman and Thompson’s theory specifies several principles 
that they say the outcomes of any deliberative procedure must respect, one of which 
being the principle of opportunity, which includes respect for the social minimum. 72  
 The work of Jürgen Habermas is different insofar as, for him, it is the 
procedure alone that legitimates the outcomes.73 His monumental Between Facts and 
Norms is the most detailed account of the constitutional state and the genesis and 
function of legitimate law written by any major political theorist in a very long time. 
The work is large, complex and often obscure. Here, I will focus only on how social 
rights fit into his understanding of political legitimacy. Like Rawls, Habermas 
recognizes that the coercive character of law produces a demand for legitimacy, but 
also that law is necessary and plays a socially integrative function.74 But the adoption 
of legitimate laws can, on his account, “fulfill the function of stabilizing behavioral 
expectations only if it preserves an internal connection with the socially integrating 
force of communicative action.” 75  His approach is also sensitive to history and 
sociology, and he offers a “reconstructive” account of the historical debate over what 
can be called the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of the moderns: basic 
individual liberty rights (what Habermas calls “private autonomy”) and democratic 
                                                        
71 Cohen, Economic Basis, supra note 70, at 33. 
72 Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? 199, 218 (2004). 
73 Habermas, supra note 66, at 278–79 for one expression of many along these lines. Rehg, supra note 
66, clarifies the various points where the proceduralist understanding is elaborated throughout the 
book. 
74 Habermas, supra note 66, at ch. 3. 
75 Id. at 84. 
 26 
self-determination through law-making (“public autonomy”). The recognition of basic 
rights enables persons to act freely and affirms their status as members of the 
community; but they can only exercise and protect (“institutionalize”) their rights 
through a system of laws created collectively.76 Habermas recognizes a ‘co-original’ 
(i.e. co-equal in importance and equally significant in genealogy) role for both ideas 
in the production of legitimate law.  
 Laws produced in this system must further be justified according to the 
discourse principle, a principle of impartial justification: “[j]ust those action norms 
are valid to which all possible affected persons could agree as participants in rational 
discourses” 77  Observance of this principle—often compared to Rawls’ notion of 
public reason, though is much more tolerant of comprehensive doctrines—represents 
proper respect for private autonomy and the need for law-making, in a “post-
metaphysical” political environment. In the effort of respecting public and private 
autonomy, and meeting the justificatory burden imposed by the discourse principle, 
he offers a “discourse theoretic justification of basic rights.”78 A system of rights is 
needed, in this formula, to “institutionalize the communicative framework for a 
rational political will-formation.”79 Such a system includes five sets of rights: the first 
three relate to rights to extensive liberty, to membership status and to actionability of 
rights in courts; a fourth relates to the equal opportunity to participate in political 
decision-making (will-formation) or consultation and discussion (opinion-formation); 
                                                        
76 The clearest exposition of this often obscure relationship is in id. at 93–94, 121–22. 
77 Id. at 107. 
78 Id. at 118–31. 
79 Id. at 111. 
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and the last is derivative of the above rights, namely, basic social and environmental 
rights. The status of this fifth set of rights is made clear: “The recognition of claims to 
social benefits…is justified in relative terms: such recognition is indirectly related to 
the guarantee of personal self-determination as a necessary condition for political self-
determination”, adding that they are meant to protect “communicative competence.”80 
These are contrasted with the “intrinsic” value of the other four categories. Other 
writers working in this tradition explore at greater length the necessary relationship 
between communicative competence and the social minimum. 81 
 While Habermas emerged from the tradition of critical theory, his justification 
of social rights as derivative of freedom and communicative competence ironically 
puts them on weaker footing than they have in Rawls’ brand of liberal egalitarianism. 
His treatment of social rights is on the whole quite ambivalent, in fact. In the final 
chapter of Between Facts and Norms, where he had earlier promised to elaborate the 
understanding of social rights, Habermas rather offers a lengthy critique of the “social 
welfare paradigm” which he argued led to excessive paternalism. While he envisages 
a more democratized, inclusive and less state-driven form of social policy, the form of 
protection and the juridical status of social rights remains quite unclear. 
                                                        
80 Id. at 417–18. 
81 James Bohman, Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, Resources, 
and Opportunities, in Deliberative Democracy, supra note 66, at 321, 337; see also Joshua Bohman, 
Public Deliberation 148 (1996); Jack Knight and James Johnson, What Sort of Equality Does 
Deliberative Democracy Require?, in Deliberative Democracy, supra note 66, at 279. 
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Compounding matters, a famous later essay of his omits mention of the social rights 
category altogether when restating the theory of rights.82  
 Despite all this, one might argue that Habermas was right about the social 
determinants of communicative competence and wrong about the juridical potential of 
constitutional social rights (and wrong too in his evaluation of the permeation of the 
social into private law). A range of influential German jurists see an important status 
for social rights whose function is to protect “factual freedom” in the social service 
state,83 and the paradigm he treats as spent is far from so, as my discussion below will 
confirm. Notably, furthermore, the leading authors in the “republican revival” in the 
United States, who all see a similar role for deliberation in legitimating law, do 
envisage a restrained but welcome role for some constitutional judicial review of 
socio-economic rights.84 In other words, deliberative democracy and even much of 
Habermas’ approach tend to support constitutional recognition of social entitlements 
and quite plausibly, dependent on instrumental considerations relating to judging, 
constitutional social rights themselves. 
                                                        
82 Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 
Pol. Theory 766 (William Rehg trans., 2001). 
83 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, at ch. 9 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002). A seminal 
other contribution in this vein was Peter Häberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, 30 
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Analysis of Constitutional Law (1988); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988); 
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<b>C. The Question of Courts 
 
It was fruitful to see how a right to a social minimum figures in the work of Rawls 
and Habermas because they are respectively the most important political philosophers 
in the Anglo-Saxon and German speaking worlds in the post-war period. Each had an 
elaborate understanding of a liberal or deliberative constitutional democracy, and both 
see a fundamental constitutional role for social rights. Too many thinkers have been 
left out of this discussion, but a keen reader would soon discover that many other 
candidates for influential political theories will come to the same or a similar result.  
Yet at the end of any such tour in democratic theory, the question hanging over any 
such account will remain—whether or not they are “constitutional” principles in the 
sense of being a core matter for the basic structure of society, is it desirable for judges 
to enforce them? My own view on this position is clear—yes, depending on the 
background political conditions prevailing in the country, though I advocate a form of 
judicial incrementalism for the countries I focus on.85 But a defence of that view is 
subtle, more instrumental and empirical than theoretical, and hence context-
dependent. I will thus in the space that remains instead examine ways of giving 
constitutional recognition to the social that are likely to be more universally 
applicable in comparative constitutional theory. 
 
<a>THE INDIRECT PROTECTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONS 
 
                                                        
85 King, supra note 2. 
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We have seen in the historical examination above that social provisions and even 
social rights provisions in constitutions can serve functions other than grounding 
direct subjective claims to social services. In this section I examine this phenomenon 
more closely. There are at least three types of such provisions that are relevant to the 
functions explored below. First, the constitution can set out a commitment to social 
welfare as a set of non-binding directive principles of state policy, as in Ireland, India 
an several other countries. Second, the constitution may enumerate rights or principles 
that, although the constitution does not declare the provision non-justiciable, judges 
and possibly drafters nevertheless understood them as not intended to create direct 
(subjective) rights (as with the Weimar constitution and several European nations). 
Third, the constitution may expressly set out commitments to principles such as the 
social state principle that we have seen in German and Spanish law, and which is also 
evident in France (“social republic” “République ... sociale” (Article 1, Constitution 
of France of 1958)). Now, the temptation to marginalize or even deride these kinds of 
unenforceable provisions is strong. This may be a misguided judgement, just as the 
underestimation of constitutional preambles is. In my contention, these provisions can 
and do play three distinct roles that can be significant in protecting and strengthening 
the social state and defence of the social minimum.  
 
<b> A. The Rejection of Neoliberal Public Law 
 
The prophylactic function of social clauses can be seen in the history of some US 
state constitutional social provisions. For instance, the state of New York held a 
constitutional convention in 1938 and among other provisions adopted its “welfare 
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clause”, its “housing clause” and various other new provisions relating to taxation and 
spending. These clauses were added to confirm the existence of the state’s powers in 
respect of these functions. The precise role for these provisions was clarified 
extensively in the important Poletti Report, a multi-volume background study on the 
case for various forms of constitutional reform.86 The report makes clear that the 
purpose was both to provide secure constitutional foundations for these powers and 
overcome various judicial decisions that had obstructed previous efforts to regulate 
labor conditions, regulate the private provision of care services, and finance poor 
relief from taxation or debt. These provisions took effect towards the end of the 
Lochner period, and hence they were less liable to review for incompatibility with the 
Federal Constitution.  
The inclusion of the social state principle in the German Basic Law did not 
have exactly that intention, though it did result from a compromise whose chief prize 
for the Social Democratic Party was a more directly prophylactic clause: the 
socialization clause, Article 15. It provides that “Land, natural resources and means of 
production may for the purpose of socialisation be transferred to public ownership or 
other forms of public enterprise by a law that determines the nature and extent of 
compensation.” Through obtaining this clause, the Social Democrats believed they 
would secure their legal right to carry out a major nationalization programme without 
any constitutional obstruction. By the time they reached power in 1966, their 
ambitions in that respect had been curtailed significantly. But the social state clause in 
article 20 continued to have significance—one that resonated with more conservative 
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Christian Democratic jurists and politicians as well. The meaning of the social state 
clause fell to be elaborated by scholars and the Federal Constitutional Court. A 
number of jurists recognized that it committed the state to actively shape the social 
sphere (Gestaltungsaufgabe) with a view to bringing about greater social protection.87 
Whatever ambiguity is implied in such a conception, it is clear that a classical liberal 
or neo-liberal conception of the state is off the table. In the post-war German practice, 
just as a range of the commentators from Abendroth to Hans Carl Nipperdey, Ulrich 
Scheuner and Otto Bachof predicted early on,88 the principle would serve often as a 
limitation principle used to justify limitations of the liberal rights provisions of the 
constitution that were deployed in Lochner-type challenges.89 The fear, moreover, that 
such a role promotes a deferential court is belied by the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
activist post-war record. 
Notably, some provisions that outwardly appear to be justiciable social rights 
provisions can be read down so as to constitute directives to the legislature instead of 
enforceable individual rights (“subjective rights” as many European jurists would call 
them). So, the constitution of Italy guarantees a suite of constitutional social rights 
                                                        
87 Bundesverfassungericht [BVerfg] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1 BVerfGE 97, 105, Dec. 19, 1951 
(Ger.); Hans Peter Ipsen, Enteignung und Sozialisierung, 10 Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung der 
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer [VVDStRL] 74 (1951).  
88 Ulrich Scheuner, Die staatliche Intervention im Bereich der Wirtschaft, 11 VVDStRL 1, 6 (1952); 
Otto Bachoff, Der soziale Rechtsstaat im Vervaltungsrechtliche Sicht, 12 VVDStRL 37, 39 (1953). For 
the thought of Hans Carl Nipperdey, Grundrechte und Privatrecht, in Festschrift für Erich Molitor zum 
75. Geburtstag 16, 19–21 (Erich Molitor and Hans Carl Nipperdey eds., 1962). 
89 As an exemplar of a much broader trend, see the decision on the 1979 Worker Co-Determination 
Law, BVerfg, 50 BVerfGE 290, March 1, 1979 (Ger.). 
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provisions. Yet in the early decades such rights were primarily interpreted as offering 
directives to legislatures, and since the 1990s have been subject to the doctrinal 
stipulation of being “conditional on finances.” 90  Here too, such underenforced 
provisions at the very least work against neoliberal interpretations of other provisions 
of Italian constitutional law.  
Rawls’ writings could in what might be called uncharitable sense be read to 
bolster a neoliberal reading of constitutional law. For instance, he asserts repeatedly 
that the basic liberties have priority over the second principle (equal opportunity and 
the difference principle). The latter is “subordinate” and even “less significant in a 
well-ordered society than the basic liberties secured by the first [principle].” 91 
Notably, also, only the political liberties are to be guaranteed their “fair value”—on 
the whole a quite limited reply to the charge laid out by Norman Daniels and Marx 
before him.92 On the other hand, Rawls takes pains to argue that the basic liberties are 
not merely formal, and emphasizes in particular the fair value of the political 
liberties.93 He justifies campaign finance and election regulation on this rationale, and 
embarks on a lengthy analysis of the infamous Buckley v. Valeo decision of the US 
Supreme Court.94 In that case, the Court recognized campaign donations as protected 
speech, and found that expenditure limitations relative to particular candidates were 
                                                        
90 See the introductory essay of Alessadra Albanesse, Italy, in Social Rights in an Age of Austerity: 
European Perspectives (Stefan Civitarese Matteucci and Simon Halliday eds., 2017). 
91 Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at Lecture VIII, 367–68 in particular. 
92 See supra note 20 (Marx), 21 (Rawls) and 74 (Daniels) and accompanying text. 
93 Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 324–31. 
94 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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unconstitutional restrictions on political expression. Rawls puts what many others 
refer to as the “anti-distortion” rationale in his own vernacular: “to ensure [the] fair 
value [of the political liberties] it is necessary to prevent those with greater property 
and wealth…from controlling the electoral process to their advantage…Formal 
equality is not enough.”95 At a more fundamental level, it is clear that Rawls’ theory 
in the round envisages a very active regulatory and redistributive role for the state. If 
liberal socialism is one of the two economic regimes he viewed as compatible with 
his theory, he quite evidently could not tolerate neoliberal readings of the basic 
liberties. His strong repudiation of both Buckley v. Valeo and Lochner v. New York 
was thus unsurprising.96  
 
<b>B. The Materialisation of Private and Labour Law 
 
Under welfare-capitalism, much of the “social” is governed by private law, including 
residential tenancy, retail banking, employment and now diverse areas of retirement, 
disability and health care services, and increasingly education and pensions. Of 
course, family law must be added to this picture. The liberal heritage has delayed, if 
not denied, the recognition in public law of positive constitutional duties to regulate 
such areas of social activity. Rather, there has been a rigorous maintenance of the 
public/private divide, with the latter as the exclusive province of public law 
(accepting meanwhile that private law liability extends to public authorities).97 One 
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96 Id., at 362. 
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plausible interpretation of social constitutional provisions is that they represent a 
constitutional decision to reject this libertarian orientation in public law and mandate 
a proactive role for the courts to extend (social) constitutional values into private law 
as a form of pan-legal public policy.98  
Germany’s legal order famously led the way in recognizing the application of 
the basic rights provisions to affect the content of civil law disputes between private 
parties (indirect horizontal effect).99 According to this doctrine, when applying in 
particular the “general clauses” of the German Civil Code such as the duty of good 
faith (article 242) and the prohibition on immoral contracts (article 138), courts must 
do so in light of the basic rights provisions of the constitution. So a contract that 
interfered with political expression would be considered immoral under this type of 
influence. From early on, scholars supporting this application of the constitutional 
rights provisions to private law, recognizing in particular state duties to protect 
(Schutzpflichten), saw them linked to the social state clause and social rule of law 
concept.100  This type of approach would later see the extension of this idea into 
contracts concerning vulnerable parties. The Federal Constitutional Court’s seminal 
“sureties case”101 recognised, reversing a finding of the Federal Court of Justice, that 
the basic rights provisions of the Basic Law of 1949 required courts to be prepared to 
invalidate contracts agreed under severe imbalances of bargaining power that led 
                                                                                                                                                              
Miami L. Rev. 401 (2003). 
98 Matthias Kumm, Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution?, 7 German L.J. 341 (2006). 
99 On which, see id.  
100 This is evident, in among other studies, in Nipperdey, supra note 88, at 16, 19–21.  
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vulnerable persons to accept gravely burdensome obligations. In that case, a father 
had arranged for his 21 year old daughter to sign a surety agreement that made her 
liable for 100,000 Deutsch Marks. The Federal Constitutional Court found that the 
right to human dignity (article 1) and the right to private autonomy found in (article 
2), read in conjunction with the social state principle (article 20(1)), required the civil 
courts to apply the general clauses in a way that inquired into the vulnerability of 
persons in the daughter’s situation. On reconsideration, the Federal Court of Justice 
found the contract unenforceable. 
It is important to see the German development as extending beyond the 
doctrines of horizontal effect and the recognition of the duty to protect, to include a 
broader reconceptualization of fundamental rights in constitutional affairs. Jürgen 
Habermas neatly summarizes the key characteristics of this transformation, which he 
situates broadly within the “dissolution of the liberal paradigm of law”: 
<quotation>These include the “reciprocal effect” (or Wechselwirkung) between ordinary 
legal statutes and fundamental rights (which remain inviolable only in their “essential content” 
(Wesensgehalt); the “implicit limits on basic rights”, which hold even for those basic 
individual rights, such as the guarantees of human dignity, that impose affirmative duties on 
the state (the so-called subjektiv-öffentliche Rechte); the “radiating effect” (Ausstralung) of 
basic rights on all areas of law and their “third-party effect” (Drittwirkung) on the horizontal 
rights and duties holding between private persons; the state’s mandates and obligations to 
provide protection, which are tasks the Court derives from the “objective” legal character of 
basic rights as principles of the legal order’ and finally, the “dynamic protection of 
constitutional rights” and the links in procedural law between such rights and the “objective” 
content of constitutional law.102</quotation> 
                                                        




The significance of the differences between this understanding of the “total 
constitution” and the narrower, American and British tradition, is best described as 
“enormous.”103 Such developments are not limited to Germany, either. The so-called 
constitutionalisation of private law is often welcomed by private law scholars who 
affirm a role for social justice in private law,104 and have had a similar impact and 
reception in labour law.105 Nevertheless, there remain left-leaning dissenters.106  
South Africa notably also follows this approach, but guided specifically by the 
social rights provisions of the constitution. The experience in this respect has been 
analysed in a masterful overview by Sandra Liebenberg.107 Horizontal application is 
provided for directly by the text of the constitution, and there is a range of cases in 
property and contract law where such provisions have been applied. Liebenberg 
concludes that it has proved difficult to unseat deep-seated baselines concerning 
respect for freedom of contract (in contract law in particular) despite the 
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constitution’s promise. This is also a recurrent theme in the German experience. Yet 
as the experience across Europe accumulates, there will likely be room for cross-
fertilisation, just as there has been in comparative human rights scholarship.   
Rawls is relevant here too, for, the classical liberal pedigree of Rawls’ tradition 
is bound up, as Liebenberg deftly shows, with a focus on state rather than private 
action, and the belief that private affairs are not suitable for state regulation. In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls seeks somewhat indirectly to overcome these limitations. 
For instance, he declares that the basic liberties are “inalienable” and this means that 
“any agreement by citizens which waives or violates a basic liberty, however rational 
and voluntary [it] may be, is void ab initio...”108 This is entirely of a piece with the 
idea of horizontal effect of the basic rights provisions, and Rawls’ language here is 
notably legalistic. In another instance, Rawls is particularly clear in his last work on 
public reason that the family is part of the basic structure of society.109 This is a 
response to feminist criticisms that his theory paid insufficient attention to justice in 
the family. Whether his objective in this regard was effectively negated by his 
statement that “political principles do not apply directly to [the family’s] internal 
life”, along with firm protection for religious doctrines that are plausibly seen as an 
impediment to gender equality, is a matter of debate among liberal as well as other 
                                                        
108 Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 365. 
109 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765 (1997), reprinted in 
Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 440 § 5.  
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feminists.110 But his intention to move past this failing in classical liberalism and his 
own earlier work was clear.  
 
<b>C. The Social Reading of the Civil Liberties 
 
Charles Reich’s “The New Property” advanced a groundbreaking thesis: that the 
creation and widespread distribution of new forms of governmental largesse, in the 
form of statutory benefits, permits and licenses, has created a new form of “property” 
within the meaning of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.111 This thesis was recognised in a footnote in the important 
Supreme Court case Goldberg v. Kelly,112 which recognised pre-termination hearing 
rights in cases where welfare (social assistance) benefits under the Aid for Family 
with Dependent Children were cut off. Frank Michelman also authored a series of 
groundbreaking articles arguing for pro-poor readings of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For my own part, I doubt the propriety of considering social benefits “property”.  This 
privileges the status quo of current holdings over the claims of redistribution, and it 
fails to discriminate between the value of different kinds of (so-called) property. 
Under such an approach, pension rights are liable to be given, and have been given, 
constitutional protection against alteration in favour of downward distribution in 
times of crisis.  
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At any rate, Reich and especially Michelman’s arguments were profound, but 
were entertained only briefly and ultimately dismissed by the courts. One reason for 
the cool reception was the absence of any textual commitment to welfare in the U.S. 
constitution. While not essential (the European Court of Human Rights takes a much 
different approach), text does seem to matter. It is therefore more plausible, as a 
matter of interpretation, to read classical civil rights in a manner that extends them 
into the domain of social relations when the text of the constitution contains express 
social commitments. This is common practice in both India and Germany. One 
advantage of this approach is that it can facilitate a gradual, more cautious expansion 
of social rights protection, leading to some experimentation. It is certainly a way to 
meet at least somewhat the persistently forceful charge that the unequal worth of 
liberty is not addressed adequately in the liberal theories of Rawls and Habermas, as 
well as the tradition of liberal constitutionalism more broadly. It would mitigate the 
objection by showing that the civil liberties are not arbitrarily sealed off from social 
justice. At the same time, the approach still allows considerations of democratic 
legitimacy, proper constitutional authorization of judicial control, and considerations 
of epistemic competency, to justify a measure of judicial deference to executive and 
legislative determinations of social policy. For that very reason, the gradualist 
expansion of social rights protection through this approacah is likely to be somewhat 
restrained. It cannot, without more by way of justification, be an alternative 
interpretive strategy used to justify reading down what are otherwise constitutionally 
entrenched social rights. If the approach in this section leads to a satisfactory state of 
affairs for the mature welfare states and comparatively highly unionized nations of 
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Europe, it may not be so in other countries seeking a deeper and more pervasive 
transformation. There is no general answer to this specific question. 
 Experimentation can be good and can facilitate the expansion of principled 
constitutional thinking in public discourse and legislation. This has certainly been the 
approach of the European Court of Human Rights (despite having no textual 
commitment to social rights) as well as the German Federal Constitutional Court. The 
experience in India, on the other hand, might not reasonably be described as cautious 
and experimental, though its expansion was somewhat gradual. However, nearly all 
agree that the experience there is very much a product of highly dysfunctional 





Constitutionalism is an outgrowth of liberal theory and politics, and that has always 
been somewhat infertile soil for the constitutional recognition of social justice.  Yet 
liberalism has transformed itself, theoretically, politically and legally, over the course 
of the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century. Distributive justice and 
social freedom are now prominent features of this tradition, and classical liberalism is 
now widely viewed to be what Rawls calls “not liberalism at all but libertarianism.”114 
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Whether he and Habermas can so easily escape the ghosts of this tradition is an open 
question. Certainly, most of the accommodations Rawls made to meet the objections 
to classical liberalism were either latecomers to justice as fairness or only latently 
within the original statement. For his part, Habermas’ relative neglect of social rights 
and distributive justice in Between Facts and Norms is as noteworthy as his clear 
inclusion of social rights in his discourse theoretic conception. Yet both traditions 
regard social justice as a foundational matter, and the social minimum in particular as 
a subject for constitutional regulation. The precise outworking of that commitment is 
unclear in their own work, but this task is for jurists, political scientists and legislators 
working in non-ideal theory. Once we consider the institutional permutations, we can 
see that the inclusion of social and social rights provisions can generate at least three 
valuable and generally applicable functions for social constitutionalism: the rejection 
of neoliberal constitutional law; the materialization of private law; and the social 
reading of the classical civil liberties. Whether constitutional drafters and judges 
should go further and provide the direct enforcement of subjective social rights claims 
is a question of public policy that can admit of national or at best regional answers, 
not theoretical and universal ones. But happily, it is in those fields that national and 
comparative lessons emerge at a striking rate. 
